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Highlights for “Distributed Energy Generation Techniques and the 
Competitive Fringe Effect in Electricity Markets” 
 We estimate a Cournot model with long-term contracts, international trade and fringe 
suppliers. 
 Fringe suppliers increase competition and lead to a smaller spot market price. 
 The pattern of the competitive fringe effect depends on the generation technology.
 Intermittent wind energy generation has a stronger effect than the CHP technology.
Page 2 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
2
Distributed Energy Generation Techniques and the 
Competitive Fringe Effect in Electricity Markets§
Machiel Muldera,b, Vaiva Petrikaitėd, Bert Scholtensa,c
June 22, 2015
Abstract
We analyse the impact of two different generation techniques used by fringe suppliers on the 
intensity of competition in the electricity wholesale market. For that purpose we derive a 
Cournot model of this market taking into account long-term contracts, international trade and 
fringe suppliers using different energy generating technologies. We apply this model to the 
Dutch market and estimate the impact of fringe supply on the Lerner index. We find that the 
fringe supply coming from both intermittent wind generation and combined heat and power 
(CHP) plants operated by horticultural farmers increases competition, which leads to lower 
prices in the electricity market. However, this impact is relatively small. 
The effect per unit of intermittent wind electricity generation on competition and, therefore, 
prices is stronger than that of the CHP technology.
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1. Introduction
Electricity markets in many European countries are subject to rapid changes due to government 
measures to promote the supply from renewable energy sources. In particular in Germany the 
share of wind and solar electricity in the total supply has reached historically unprecedented 
levels. During off-peak hours, this share is often more than 50% (Fraunhofer Institut, 2014). This 
strong increase in the supply from the intermittent generation sources with very low marginal 
costs reduces electricity prices, which is good news for electricity consumers. However, it also 
depresses incentives for investments in conventional power plants which may still be needed in 
case of insufficient supply from the renewable sources. 
Another potential effect of the growing supply from renewable energy sources is that it 
raises the intensity of competition in the electricity wholesale markets. Since the start of the 
liberalisation of these markets, concerns existed about the lack of competition. The electricity 
wholesale markets are widely viewed to be vulnerable to competition problems because of the
highly inelastic and volatile demand and the impossibility to store electricity while demand 
needs to be permanently equal to supply (Holmberg and Newbery, 2010). Indications of abuse of 
market power in electricity wholesale markets are detected by, amongst others, Borenstein et al.
(2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), Van Damme (2005), Bushnell (2007), Bushnell et al. (2008), 
and Fowlie (2009). In order to improve the functioning of the wholesale markets, a number of 
regulatory measures have been taken. These measures included a restructuring process which 
encompassed both vertical and horizontal unbundling although the extent of vertical unbundling 
varied among the EU member-states (Newbery, 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). The separated 
transmission and distribution systems became subject to regulatory supervision, while the 
generation entities became commercial parties operating on wholesale markets. These measures 
have contributed to a more efficient allocation in the electricity wholesale markets (see e.g. 
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Amundsen and Bergman, 2006; Green, 2011; Mulder, 2015). At the same time, awareness of 
climate change challenges grew while new technologies to cope with these challenges spread out 
in society (Grimaud et al., 2011). Especially (distributed) generation of renewable energy took 
off (Lior, 2012). These changes may also have an impact on the intensity of competition. This is 
the topic of our paper. 
We focus on the impact of the supply from two different distributed techniques on 
competition. We measure this impact through the effect of changes in the residual supply on the 
Lerner index. The residual demand captures both the total demand and the responses by fringe 
suppliers, i.e. agents whose supply is fully determined by their marginal costs in relation to the 
actual market price. Hence, the supply function of the fringe suppliers can be seen as negative 
demand from the perspective of the incumbents. The aim of our study is to estimate the impact of 
this fringe supply on competition and to analyse the differences in the way different techniques
might have such an impact. We find that wind supply as an intermittent price-insensitive 
technique has a different effect on the market than the supply from horticultural farmers using 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants combined with heat-storing facilities enabling them to 
be price sensitive.
Our analysis is directed at the Dutch wholesale electricity market during the period 2007-
2011. A number of years ago, serious concerns were raised about the limited liquidity of this 
market and the ability of the incumbents to exert market power during peak hours (see Van 
Damme, 2005). Since then, the Dutch market has become more integrated with the neighbouring 
countries through both physical and virtual extensions of cross-border capacity (Mulder and 
Schoonbeek, 2013). Within the Dutch electricity market, the share of distributed generation has 
grown strongly to about 40%, according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS;
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http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/default.aspx). The majority of this distributed capacity is installed 
for own use by firms in a wide variety of industries. Only a small part of this capacity is used to 
supply electricity to the wholesale market. In particular, the generation capacity owned by 
horticultural farmers is increasingly used to act as a fringe supply (Velden and Smit, 2011). In 
this respect, the supply from their CHP plants is related to the outside temperature as it is mainly 
a by-product of the production of heat and CO2, which is an input in the horticultural industry. 
The horticultural farmers can fine-tune the timing of the supply to the market because of their 
ability to store the heat, enabling them to produce electricity during peak hours and to use the 
heat during night. In addition, and for comparison reasons, we also study the supply from 
distributed wind mills, which also can be regarded as fringe supply, as the electricity that is 
generated is directly supplied to the grid. In contrast to the horticultural farmers, producers of 
wind energy are almost completely unable to fine tune their supply of electricity as it is 
predominantly weather conditions that drive the (changes in) their electricity production while 
storage options are not available.
In this paper, we estimate a structural market model of the Dutch electricity market and, 
by using counterfactual simulations, evaluate the effect of the competitive fringe on competition 
in the market. The price sensitive competitive fringe supply is about 0.5 per cent of total 
electricity production in the Netherlands. Therefore, although we find that the Lerner index 
during peak hours would be higher if there was no competitive fringe in the market, the effect is 
very small. Hence, we conclude that the fringe supply so far only has a minor impact on 
competition in the Dutch electricity market. We also conclude that the different technologies for 
distributed generation have a quite different impact on competition. Horticultural farmers using 
CHP plants in particular affect competition during winter days when temperatures are low, 
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whereas the impact of wind supply on competition depends on the actual wind speed. We find a 
more pronounced impact on competition and prices of electricity from wind energy than from 
CHP plants (see also Meibom et al., 2009; Ketterer, 2012). This different effect can be due to 
differences in the elasticity of residual demand when these technologies operate or to the 
different levels of intermittency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical 
background of our model which is presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the data used for 
the estimations of our model, while Section 5 presents the results. We conclude in section 6.
2. Modelling market power in the electricity market
There are two main strands of literature on electricity market modelling.1 One group of 
papers, starting from Allaz and Vila (1993), is based on the assumption that electricity producers 
compete a la Cournot oligopolists (see also Borenstein et al. (1995), Arrellano (2003), Bushnell 
(2007), Bushnell et al. (2008), Fowlie (2009), Lambertini and Tampieri (2012)). The main 
drawback of Cournot competition models is that they may systematically overestimate market 
power of firms. If sellers follow a slightly different pattern than the standard Cournot 
competition set-up and if it is assumed that the firms compete a la Cournot, then the estimated 
mark-ups can be much higher than the actual ones (Willems et al., 2009). If the oligopolists can 
sell their products prior to its production (i.e. forward trading), competition is set to intensify. In 
effect, the competition may intensify so far as to imply convergence to the Bertrand equilibrium, 
as shown in Allaz and Vila (1993).
                                                          
1 We mention just a few of many papers that address electricity market models in this paper. Ventosa et al. (2005)
and Willems et al. (2009) provide a detailed literature review on electricity market modelling.
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As a result, a second strand of structural electricity market models has emerged, based on 
the seminal supply function equilibrium (SFE) model  of Klemperer and Meyer (1989). 
According to this framework, firms face market uncertainty and choose their supply functions 
instead of only quantities. In most wholesale spot electricity markets, sellers submit their day-
ahead supply schedules and buyers submit their day-ahead demand schedules, while an 
auctioneer sets a day-ahead equilibrium price and quantity by crossing these demand and supply 
schedules.2 The advantage of this approach is that the supply function equilibrium allows more 
competitive behaviour of firms than the Cournot framework. 
Willems et al. (2009) find that there is no significant difference among Cournot 
competition and SFE models in their analysis of the German electricity market if the existence of 
an electricity forward market is taken into account. The existence of such a forward electricity 
market puts additional competitive pressure on the firms and the equilibria in the Cournot and 
SFE frameworks become similar.3 As a result, in this paper, we will apply a Cournot competition 
model which incorporates the forward electricity market. According to our results, the Cournot 
competition model quite well describes the Dutch electricity market during peak hours. 
However, the electricity producers´ behaviour is more in line with the competitive SFE model
during off-peak hours, which would result in an overestimation of market power under the 
Cournot competition model. 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the fringe supply on competition in the electricity 
market. In our set-up, we assume that the (few) large electricity producers behave a la
Stackelberg leaders and face a competitive fringe in the Dutch electricity market. The idea to 
                                                          
2 For the examples of using SFE in the electricity market analysis see Green and Newbery (1992), Hortaçu and 
Puller (2008), Ciarreta and Espinosa (2010).
3 The effect that a forward market makes a spot market more competitive has been observed by Holmberg (2011) 
and Newbery (1998) in SFE electricity market models and by Eijkel and Moraga-González (2010) in a Cournot 
competition model.
Page 8 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
8
introduce a competitive fringe in the electricity market analysis is not completely new. The 
analysis usually starts with Allaz and Vila (1993) who introduce the possibility of forward 
trading. Bushnell (2007) extends their model to an environment with multiple firms and 
increasing marginal cost. He finds that when forward contracts are present, the importance of 
supplier concentration is greatly magnified relative to other determinants of unilateral market 
power such as demand elasticity. Puller (2007) applies Cournot competition model on the 
Californian electricity market by introducing a competitive fringe. Floro (2009) uses both
Cournot and Stackelberg competition models in the analysis of the Italian electricity market. She 
finds that the model where the competitive fringe behaves a la Stackelberg follower fits better to 
explain the market equilibrium. However, in line with Puller (2007), she does not consider a 
forward market. Neuhoff et al. (2005) simulate the European electricity market for different 
competitive set-ups. They find that a competitive fringe has a negative effect on the market 
power of large electricity producers. However, their conclusions are drawn by using only the 
estimated electricity demand whereas we use a structural market model. Fowlie (2009) uses a 
Cournot model to demonstrate the role of industry structure and firm conduct to determine the 
extent to which emission leakage occurs as well as the welfare effects of incomplete regulation.
Another extension of our research is that we look into different technologies regarding 
the fringe supply. We investigate the impact of the fringe supply of horticultural farmers who use 
combined heat and power (CHP) installations. Furthermore, we account for the provision of 
electricity with an intermittent source of energy, namely wind. The latter has been investigated 
by others before (Ambec and Crampes, 2012; Spiecker et al., 2013). However, these studies do 
not focus on the role of the fringe supply and do not model the market as a whole. Both our 
fringe suppliers are distributed generators of electricity. As far as we are aware of, the literature 
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so far does not investigate the role of different technologies in the fringe supply within the 
context of the Cournot and SFE model of the electricity market. 
3. Model
In this section we provide the derivation of the electricity market model that we use in the 
empirical analysis. The market is characterized by a continuum of electricity consumers having 
different preferences, which results in an aggregated demand (
 , (1)
where P is the price, is a vector of other factors that affect electricity demand, ,  and are 
the parameters and  is a random error term. The value of  is observable in the spot market and 
firms know only the distribution of  when they sign their forward contracts. The electricity 
market is open to both exports and imports. Electricity importing companies are price takers and 
behave as a Stackelberg follower. The supply of the importers is approximated by a linear supply 
function and is included in . 
Next to the competitive import, electricity is sold by  large local electricity producers 
and a price sensitive local competitive fringe, which consists of horticultural energy suppliers. 
The supply function of this fringe is approximated by , where  is a positive 
parameter. The wind energy suppliers are price insensitive and their supply is driven by wind 
speed only. We label the quantity supplied by these producers as . Consequently, the residual 
demand served by the large producers becomes
. (2)
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The large producers are active in both the spot and forward markets. Therefore, every 
firm solves a two stage optimization problem. In the first stage, a producer chooses an optimal 
forwardly traded quantity. The actual production level and, thus, the optimal quantity for the spot 
market, is chosen in the second stage (see Appendix A for the more detailed model derivations). 
After solving the first stage profit maximization problem, we obtain the optimal value for the 
forwardly traded quantity. We plug this quantity in the second stage first order condition which 
gives us the following equation 
, (3)
where  is the sum of marginal costs of all firms. For estimation purposes we multiply the 
values of quantities and marginal costs by appropriate expressions of  and replace matrix by 
the following variables affecting electricity demand: a trend variable, the length of daylight (DL)
and the set of hour and day dummies (D). As such, we arrive at the following equation, for which 
we provide estimation results in Section 5: 
, (4)
where,  ,  , , and . 
In the estimation process, we mostly focus on the identification of parameter  which 
captures the slope of the fringe supply function. This is done by incorporating additional 
information on the electricity supply of the horticultural sector. Namely, we replace the element
 in equation (2) by the observable quantity of the sector, which is denoted by and arrive 
at equation (5)
 (5)
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where By estimating equation (5) we obtain the value of , which allows 
us to identify the value of .
4. Market and data description
4.1. Market description
In 2007-2011 the electricity demand in the Netherlands was met by six big electricity 
producers4, imported energy and decentralized generation. In 2007 the share of centralized 
production in total supply was 55%, but this decreased to 52% in 2011. The contribution of 
decentralized production increased from 27% in 2007 to 31% in 2011 and the share of import 
was about 17% in both years. The intensity of competition in the Dutch electricity market grew 
over time as a result of the increase in generation capacity, in particular decentralized and more 
cross-border capacity (Mulder and Schoonbeek, 2013; Mulder, 2015). During the off-peak hours 
(10PM – 9AM)5 the imported energy takes care of about 27% of the total residual demand 
(excluding supply from decentralized production) and the six electricity producers account for 
73%. Meanwhile, during the peak hours (10AM – 9PM) electricity import takes 19% of total 
domestic demand, the big producers supply about 81% of the total residual demand. Additionally 
there is a big difference in the market price during the peak and off-peak hours: the average peak 
period price in 2007-2011 is 62 Euro/MWh while average off-peak price is 39 Euro/MWh in this 
period. Furthermore, the off-peak price is often below the marginal production costs, whereas the 
                                                          
4 During the analyzed period there was no entry and exit in the group of these firms.
5 Usually, the hours between 8AM and 11PM are called as peak hours, and the hours between 10AM and 6PM are 
called as super-peak hours. We have noticed that the oligopolistic model with a competitive fringe provides the best 
fit for the hours between 10AM and 9PM. These are mainly super-peak hours and a high electricity consumption in 
the additional hours can be explained by intensive electricity consumption by households in the first quarter of the 
year.
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peak price is always above marginal production costs. 6 Therefore, we conclude that the degree 
of competition during the peak hours is much smaller, and in our analysis, we treat the Dutch 
electricity market in this period as an oligopolistic market with a competitive fringe.
Of all the decentralized electricity production that takes place during the peak hours only a 
fraction of it is supplied to the market. The major part of the energy is produced by the chemical 
industry and other energy-intensive industries during production processes and is used for own 
needs. The later production is insensitive to the market price and has an effect on the intercept of 
the total linear demand function. In the estimation process we control for this by using hour 
specific dummies.
The electricity that is supplied by the competitive fringe consists of wind energy and the 
electricity produced by horticultural firms. The production technology of both supplier types is 
very different which leads to different supply decisions. The wind energy generation features 
zero marginal production costs. Therefore, the main factor that determines whether the wind 
energy is supplied to the market is a sufficient wind speed. Furthermore, this supply is practically 
insensitive to the electricity market price: The correlation coefficient between wind power and 
the electricity price is no more than -0.02 (see also Figure 1b). As a result, in the derived model 
the supplied quantity enters the residual demand of big electricity producers by reducing the 
intercept. However, the supply of electricity from the horticultural sector is price sensitive. The 
electricity is a side product of the horticultural suppliers whose main objective is to produce heat 
for their greenhouses. According to their heat production technology, the horticultural suppliers 
can store the heat with some heat losses which happen due to the storage. The producers choose 
the time period of heat and electricity generation by comparing their production and storage costs 
                                                          
6The fact that an off-peak price happens to be below the marginal production costs can be explained by high 
dynamic dispatch costs of the plants: for a relatively short period firms may decide to supply electricity when their 
marginal costs are above the market price, because not producing would result in higher costs.
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with the price of electricity in the market. As soon as the electricity market price exceeds their 
marginal costs, the horticultural suppliers start supplying electricity to the market. The size of the 
heat-production facilities and the demand for heat vary among the horticultural farmers 
supplying electricity, which leads to a different number of the horticultural suppliers for every 
market price. While comparing the supplied electricity quantity with the wholesale market price 
we have observed that the horticultural supply function can be well approximated by the linear 
supply function (Figure 1a). Additionally, after estimating the linear relationship between the 
wholesale market price and the amount of the electricity that was produced by the horticultural 
sector, we find that the coefficient next to the supplied quantity by the horticultural firms equals
0.5965 and is significantly above zero. Meanwhile, after estimating the linear relationship 
between the wholesale market price and the amount of electricity produced by wind energy 
suppliers, we find that the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. 
(a) (b)
Figure 1. The relationship between the produced electricity in a horticultural sector (a) and wind energy (b) 
and spotprices.
The incumbent firms use different electricity generating technologies and their power 
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plants vary in their marginal costs. In the analysis, we assume that firms dispatch their power 
plants according to their merit order. Then by plotting the marginal cost curves of the producers
we noticed that every firm produced in the range of relatively flat marginal costs (see Figure 2). 
Hence, in the subsequent derivations we assume that the sellers employ constant-returns-to-scale 
technology which results in constant marginal production costs. 
The economic slowdown that took place in Europe starting from 2008 had an effect on 
electricity demand in the Netherlands. Additionally, because of the technological progress both 
firms and households needed less electricity to satisfy their needs (see Table 1 for the details). In 
order to capture this effect we introduce a linear yearly trend in the model. 
Figure 2 Marginal costs in the Dutch electricity market, on average per year in 2007, 2009 and 2011 (source: 
Mulder, 2015).
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Table 1. The amount of electricity that was sold in NL during peak hours in 2007 (Q1)-2011 (Q1)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total residual demand, MWha 12116 11474 10892 10818 9995
Change - -5.30% -5.07% -0.68% -7.61%
a Total residual demand is computed by taking the total production of the incumbent firms, subtracting export and 
adding import and the supply of the fringe. 
4.2. Data
We use hourly data on the centralized production units in the Dutch market, obtained 
from the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets. This database includes hourly data 
regarding the available generation capacity as well as the level of production for all centralized 
production units in the Dutch market over the period 2007-2011. In addition, the database 
contains information about the technical characteristics of each plant, such as generation 
technique, maximum technical capacity, fuel type and fuel efficiency. By combining these data 
with data on fuel prices, we are able to determine the hourly marginal costs of each plant. The 
marginal costs include fuel costs, operating and maintenance costs as well as start-and-stop costs. 
(see Mulder (2015) for the data description and the methodology how these costs are calculated).
From earlier studies, we know that electricity producing oligopolies do not always behave 
as Cournot competitors (Yao et al., 2004). In order to check this, we compute the Lerner index, 
labelled as Lactual  in Table 4, which is based on the data about APX
7 spot prices and the actual 
marginal costs. We observe that for some hours this index becomes negative, which implies that 
a Cournot competition model cannot be applied for these hours. Hence, for the estimations, we 
                                                          
7 APX is one of Europe’s premier providers of power exchange and clearing services for the wholesale market, 
operating transparent platforms in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium.
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use the hours from 10AM to 9PM on working days (thus excluding public holidays and weekend 
days). In addition, we use the observations from a specific quarter (the 1st) in 2007-2011 in order 
to control for seasonal effects in demand. After this selection procedure, we end up with 3780 
observations in total (about 750 observations per year). The summary statistics of the variables 
are presented in Table 2.
As data on fringe supply are not directly available, we compute these data using 
information on other variables. For the supply by the horticultural farmers, we are able to use the 
fact that they produce electricity as a side product of heat production through Combined Heat 
and Power (CHP) plants. The horticultural farmers can store the produced heat for a number of 
hours or days while  the heat storage costs depend on the outdoor temperature. The lower the
outdoor temperature the more heat is needed for greenhouses. Therefore, a horticultural supplier 
does not store its produced heat for a long time (days) if it is cold outside. On the other hand, if 
temperature is high, additional heat may be not be needed, which implies that the heat cannot be 
used at all. As a result, the heat storage loss, the costs of storage and, hence, the marginal costs of 
producing electricity by CHP plants are positively  correlated with the outdoor temperature. This 
implies that electricity production costs are lower when the outside temperature is lower. 
According to our modelling assumptions, every horticultural supplier has constant 
marginal electricity production costs, and the joint upward sloping marginal cost curve appears 
due to different options that producers have to utilise the heat and that depend on the type of their 
cultivation and the technical efficiency of the CHP plants.8 When the outdoor temperature 
decreases, the marginal costs of all horticultural suppliers decreases. Therefore, for any market 
price the quantity that is supplied by the fringe suppliers is higher when the outside temperature 
                                                          
8 How the CHP plants differ in their technology and efficiency is very well described by the United States 
Environment Protection Agency “Efficiency Benefits”, available at http://www.epa.gov/chp/basic/efficiency.html
(accessed: 2014 Dec. 9).
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decreases.9 Thus, we use the outdoor temperature as an instrument, to compute the horticultural 
electricity supply.
We transform hourly temperature data from the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute
(KNMI; www.knmi.nl/klimatologie) into the data on daily heating degree days (HDD), which is 
the general measure to measure energy demand related to heating.10 Next, we use the daily 
values for HDD to allocate the aggregated annual supply over days, based on data from the 
Agricultural Economic Research Institute (Van der Velden and Smit, 2011), and by using hourly 
HDD data we compute hourly electricity supply of the horticultural sector. 11
                                                          
9 The decrease in the marginal costs of all horticultural suppliers shifts their joint supply curve vertically but does 
not affect the slope.
10 HDD are defined as the number of degrees Celsius the average daily temperature is below the threshold of 18 
degrees Celsius. Thus, if the outdoor temperature is lower, then HHD value is higher.
11 The horticultural electricity supply is computed by using the following formula , where 
is the annual electricity supply of the horticultural sector and  is the sum of HDD over all days in a year.
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the variables, 1st quarter, 2007-2011 
(MC: in euro/MWh; others in MWh/h average per day)
Year 
(Q1)
Observations Statistics
Production
(centralized)
Export Import MC Supply wind
Supply 
horticulture
mean 9925.05 442.10 2599.20 136.81 14.44 19.72
sd 833.09 349.56 379.07 25.50 17.24 5.68
min 7398.78 0.00 1750.00 98.62 0.46 9.48
2007 768
max 11836.35 1504.00 3397.00 222.15 78.42 33.79
mean 9814.93 453.65 2058.70 300.40 22.50 31.42
sd 581.25 398.11 524.06 19.81 20.97 6.32
min 7967.72 20.00 1124.00 266.01 0.29 21.20
2008 744
max 11221.29 1673.80 3437.00 379.52 90.49 48.18
mean 9592.68 1251.17 2502.15 217.95 13.46 34.67
sd 666.96 549.85 497.75 59.93 15.47 7.43
min 7066.24 304.00 1188.00 144.27 0.00 24.12
2009 744
max 10741.76 3537.00 4012.00 462.38 75.60 56.37
mean 11056.58 1536.72 1247.56 177.26 9.93 40.25
sd 710.38 463.91 481.51 19.59 9.67 11.94
min 8921.57 356.90 132.00 143.97 1.13 10.02
2010 756
max 12462.30 2917.10 2602.00 244.44 54.85 63.77
mean 8643.56 878.48 2175.28 240.30 13.38 40.86
sd 498.86 436.85 697.40 12.24 22.31 10.22
min 6537.88 75.00 452.00 219.75 0.00 21.93
2011 768
max 9959.35 3064.40 3900.00 304.03 156.30 60.27
A similar approach has been applied with respect to computing wind energy supply. From 
the German market, we know that the level of production by wind mills is strongly related to the 
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wind speed when the latter is translated into wind power (Mulder and Scholtens, 2013).12 Hence, 
for defining the relationship between the wind speed and generated wind energy, we use the data 
on the total annual electricity production by wind mills from Statistics Netherlands (www.cbs.nl)
and the data on the hourly wind speed from the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (source: 
www.knmi.nl). Then, we use hourly data on wind speed to generate hourly wind energy 
supply.13
5. Results
We first estimate equation (5) by using Newey-West OLS estimators. None of the 
variables exhibit any significant stationarity-related problems (testing results are available upon 
request). The estimation results are presented in column Model A in Table 3. We find a negative 
effect of the marginal costs on the residual demand, as expected. Also daylight shows a negative 
coefficient, which partly follows from the fact that electricity is used for lighting. We also detect 
a negative trend, which can be explained by the fact that the demand for electricity has declined 
with the advent of the economic crisis (TenneT, 2012). Finally, we find that especially the super 
peak hours in the morning show a significantly higher electricity demand. 
                                                          
12 In the German market, daily data on both wind generation and wind speed is available. The correlation coefficient 
between wind generation and wind power appears to be about 0.85. Wind power is related to the cube of wind speed 
if wind speed is not lower than about 4 m/s or not above about 25 m/s (source: www.pfr.co.uk/pfr) .
13 The supply of wind energy producers is computed by using the following formula:  where is an 
annual wind energy supply,  is the cubic speed of wind and   is the sum of cubic wind speed over the year. We 
also account for the cases when the wind is too strong or too weak. In these cases wind turbines are turned off. 
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Table 3. Estimation results
Model A Model B
Variable
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
MC -9.970** (3.109) -9.764** (3.118)
Daylight -3.871*** (0.494) -3.911*** (0.496)
Year (trend) -364.8*** (27.76) -359.3*** (27.90)
Day_2 238.1* (111.9) 239.3* (112.3)
Day_3 187.6 (115.6) 189.8 (115.9)
Day_4 181.2 (107.4) 183.6 (107.7)
Day_5 232.8* (104.4) 232.8* (104.6)
Hour_10 799.3*** (44.45) 799.2*** (44.53)
Hour_11 789.4*** (49.71) 789.3*** (49.80)
Hour_12 772.4*** (49.96) 772.3*** (50.05)
Hour_13 608.3*** (48.57) 608.2*** (48.66)
Hour_14 628.2*** (47.30) 628.1*** (47.39)
Hour_15 532.4*** (45.98) 532.3*** (46.07)
Hour_16 415.1*** (45.30) 415.0*** (45.39)
Hour_17 341.0*** (43.59) 340.9*** (43.67)
Hour_18 390.2*** (45.61) 390.2*** (45.69)
Hour_19 383.9*** (44.07) 383.8*** (44.14)
Hour_20 413.0*** (30.96) 413.0*** (31.01)
Constant 13555.6*** (346.1) 13591.5*** (348.3)
N 3780 3780
F 50.39 49.75
df_m 18 18
df_r 3761 3761
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001
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For the identification of we estimate equation (5) and the estimation results are in Table 
3 (Model B). The coefficient for the marginal costs is the value of  and it is significantly 
negative. Furthermore, both the daily and hourly patterns are quite in line with the results for 
Model A.
After we estimate the values of  and we can compute the value of . When this 
value is known, we set in equation (5) and simulate the total produced quantity which 
would be supplied if there were no horticultural firms. Then we use this predicted quantity in 
equation (2) to compute the predicted market price Pno_hort. By using the information on 
predicted price we compute the Lerner index Lno_hort.
Similarly, by setting  in equation (5) we compute how much large electricity 
producers would produce if there were no wind energy suppliers. Then we use this predicted 
quantity to compute a new equilibrium market price and a new Lerner index. Both the price and 
the index have a subscript no_wind. The simulation results for the electricity price and the Lerner 
index are given in Table 4. For the comparison reasons we add by the model estimated
equilibrium price and the Lerner index denoted by PEst and LEst respectively.
14
                                                          
14 Lerner index for a Cournot oligopoly model is computed by using formula  and  is computed by using 
the following algorithm. In a Cournot competition model . If we sum this equation across all the firms 
then we get . Thus, .
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Table 4 . The electricity spot price and the Lerner index in different scenarios, 2007 (Q1)-2011 (Q1)
Mean St.dev. Min Max
Pactual 59.754 18.426 22.95 250
PEst 60.204 10.935 41.674 102.691
Pno_hort 60.823 10.946 42.253 103.356
Pno_wind 61.714 11.354 42.146 102.792
Lactual 0.4664 0.1372 -0.0253 1.0983
LEst 0.5060 0.1188 0.2840 0.8160
Lno_hort 0.5130 0.1191 0.2890 0.8239
Lno_wind 0.5219 0.5219 0.2849 0.8307
Table 4 shows that the supply from wind and horticultural industry has a positive effect 
on competition. Without this supply both the electricity price and the Lerner index would be 
higher. Without the supply of wind the electricity price is about 1.51 euro/MWh higher, while the 
absence of the fringe supply from the horticultural farmers would result in 0.62 euro/MWh 
higher prices (see also Mulder and Scholtens, 2013). The Lerner index would be 0.016 higher in 
the first case and 0.007 in the second one.15
                                                          
15 While comparing the coefficients next to MC both in Model A and Model B in Table 3, we obtain that t statistics 
equals 2.8764, which allows rejecting the hypothesis that  equals zero. However, the significance of the impact of 
fringe supply must be treated with caution due to additional error terms that appear due to the use of instruments to 
measure the supply of the fringe.
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(a) ΔPno_hort=PEst-Pno_hort (b) ΔPno_wind= PEst-Pno_wind
Figure 3. The effect of horticultural producers (a) and wind energy suppliers (b) on the spot market price of 
electricity
(a) ΔLno_hort=LEst-Lno_hort (b) ΔLno_wind= LEst-Lno_wind
Figure 4. The effect of horticultural producers (a) and wind energy suppliers (b) on the Lerner index of the 
electricity market
In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the change in the spot price and the Lerner index respectively
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if the horticultural electricity producers (a) or wind energy suppliers (b) were not in the market. 
As one can easily observe, the effect of the horticultural electricity producers on the equilibrium 
price shows a strong seasonal pattern. As the average temperature increases during the first 
quarter, the electricity supply by the horticultural sector decreases, which increases the residual 
demand for the large producers. This results in the fact that the horticultural producers play a 
smaller role in the spot market. In contrast, wind speed does not show a seasonal pattern over the 
first quarter of the calendar year and features intermittency. As a result, the effect of wind 
producers on the spot market price does not show a clear trend over time. 
In Figure 5, we depict the effect of the average impact per unit of supply by the 
horticultural suppliers and the wind energy suppliers on the spot market price. Again because of 
a smaller effect on competition the average effect of the horticultural suppliers on the spot price 
is smaller than the one of the wind energy suppliers. The different patterns for the two 
technologies occur due to the different manner in which the two types of fringe suppliers enter 
the residual demand function. The wind energy producers are price insensitive and, thus, their 
fringe supply decreases the intercept of the linear residual demand function. Because of the 
assumptions about the linear marginal cost and the demand functions, the average effect of the 
wind energy producers on the spot market price is linear as well. However, the horticultural 
farmers affect the residual demand of the large electricity producers by altering the slope of the 
residual demand. Furthermore, due to the fluctuations in the residual demand – which happens 
due to the daylight, wind energy supply and other factors – the effect of the horticultural farmers 
on the electricity spot price is fluctuating.
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Figure 5. The impact of fringe supply of wind energy and CHP on electricity spot price changes
5. Conclusion
We investigate the competitive fringe effect in the Dutch electricity market, focussing on 
how two very different generation techniques (horticultural Combined Heat and Power 
generation and wind mills) interact with the conventional energy system. We account for spot 
and forward contracts as well as international electricity trade. The model is estimated on the 
basis of 3780 observations in the period 2007-2011. We observe that the fringe supply plays a 
minor role in the intensity of competition in the Dutch wholesale market for electricity. We find 
that without the supply of wind, the electricity prices would be about € 1.50 / MWh higher, and 
that without the fringe supply from the horticultural farmers, electricity prices would be about € 
0.63 / MWh higher. The Lerner index would be 0.01 higher in the former case and 0.005 in the 
latter. As such, we conclude that the fringe supply from the price insensitive wind farmers has a 
much more pronounced impact on prices and competition than that of the horticultural farmers 
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with their CHP facilities(see also Meibom et al., 2009).
Our model and results complement the existing literature in several respects. We have 
advanced Puller’s (2007) Cournot competition model by accounting for electricity forward 
contracts. Our results are in line with those of Neuhoff et al. (2005), but ours are based on a 
structural market model. We include fringe supply from two alternative technologies which has 
not been studied before. The next challenge is to include additional technologies and to estimate 
the model within a market setting with substantially more renewable energy generation.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the model
We assume that there are N oligopolists which produce electricity in the market and
compete a la Cournot. The firms sell electricity either in the local market or abroad. There are 
countries where the oligopolist may export electricity to. We label the export price (including 
transportation fees) in country  as . The total export to country  is denoted by . The total 
export of firm is labelled  and the export of firm  to country  is . All the firms have 
constant marginal production costs and we denote the marginal costs of firm  by . Next to 
exports, firm  sells electricity in both spot and forward markets. We label the forwardly traded 
quantity of firm  as and the forward market equilibrium price is denoted by . The total 
forwardly traded quantity is labelled as . Firms sign their forward contracts well before the 
spot market takes place. Hence, the profit maximization problem of a firm is in two stages. 
In the first stage, the firm opens its forward position by maximizing its expected profit. In 
the second stage, the firm chooses its import, export and actual production quantities. As a result,
we solve the profit maximization problem backwards. Firstly, we solve for the optimal import,
export and actual production quantities as functions of . Afterwards, we solve the profit 
maximization problem with respect to forward quantities. Then, the profit maximization problem 
of firm  in the second stage is as follows
  (A.1)
where the local residual demand is satisfied by locally produced minus exported electricity. i.e.
(A.2)
Page 31 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
31
The firm chooses its exports and produced quantities simultaneously. Thus, we get the following 
system of first order conditions for firm .
(A.3)
(A.4)
One can readily observe that the optimal export quantity does not depend on the production 
volumes as long as marginal costs are constant. From the first order conditions (A.3)-(A.4) we 
get 
(A.5)
Hence, we can treat the exported quantities of a firm as constants in the subsequent derivations.
We plug in the value of  and its derivative with respect to in equation (A.3) multiply it by
and get equation (A.6), which is linear in .
(A.6)
where .
 There are  firms in the mark t. Therefore we get the system of  first order conditions, which 
we can summarize by where
, and
Then after applying Cramer’s rule we get that
(A.7)
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If we sum (A.7) over all the firms and multiply by . we get
(A.8)
where .
Now we move to the first stage optimization problem of a firm which can be written as follows
(A.9)
We omit export income in this stage because the optimal export quantity does not depend on the 
forward position of the firm. Also note that  and  must equal 
zero in equilibrium because of a non-arbitrage condition. Therefore, the first order condition of 
firm  in the first stage is 
(A.10)
We plug in the value of  from (A.7) , QR from (A.8) and their derivatives to (A.10),
multiply by  and get equation (A.11).
(A.11)
After we sum (A.12) over all the firms we get
(A.12)
which gives 
(A.13)
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We plug this value of  in (A.8) and get the equation which we estimate in section 4: 16
(A.14) 
Appendix B
Histograms for the effect of horticultural supply and wind supply on electricity spot price 
changes
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16 Note that 
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Appendix C
Histograms for the effect of horticultural supply and wind supply on changes in the Lerner 
index
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